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Abstract
This paper is an investigation of the decision making theories, their develop

ments, and especially, their applications. After locating the two rivals, the Expected
Utility Theory (EUT) and the Prospect Theory (PT), within the general context of deci

sion making situations, it compares their main features and examines the PT extensions.
EUT and PT as descriptive models are then shown coexisting within the same grand
likelihood function, thus providing a detailed example for Finite Mixture Models. Other

illustrative application examples in the fields of astronomy and medical diagnosis expose
some of the technical difficulties when constructing maximum likelihood functions.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
There is a lot written in the literature comparing Expected Utility Theory and
Prospect Theory. For one, EU theory is very old, dating back to Bernouilli himself, and

Prospect Theory grew out of its shortcomings.
The second chapter of this study reviews the important basic concepts such as
decision making under certainty, decision making under risk, utility functions, decision

under uncertainty and a few others that are used in this document. It will also review
the desirable properties any theory of human decision might want to have.

’

The third chapter presents examples of utility theory and details its specific fail

ures. This section will show, for instance, that Expected Utility Theory being true for any
utility function is equivalent to a set of axioms: the Von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms.
In fact, Prospect Theory initially noted that some of these axioms are not empirically

true: people just don’t make decisions like that. The relation between the curvature of the
utility function and risk aversion is analyzed at this point. This section then shows the

remedies suggested by the Prospect Theory before assessing this same theory’s limitations
and extensions. For instance, a short section will show that important properties of the

Prospect Theory such as first order stochastic dominance, and transitivity come into play
only when there are more than 2 outcomes. Additionally, Cumulative Prospect Theory,

which is the most theoretically sound formulation of PT because it respects stochastic
dominance and transitivity, is mostly useful when there is a continuum of outcomes.

The fourth chapter analyzes the more recent models developed by Glenn W.
Harrison, E. Elisabet Rutstrom in 2008 [GH08]. These authors suggest that a finite
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mixture model can be used to estimate the parameters of each decision process while
simultaneously estimating the probability that each theory applies to the sample. This

section compares EUT versus PT and the degree to which they satisfy the properties
of Von-Neumann Morgenstern properties, stochastic dominance, transitivity, certainty,
reflection and isolation effects. In addition to these properties, we will look at scale
independence of these models: do the behavioral predictions of these models depend on
the denomination/units of the rewards/losses. It could be that people’s decisions are

influenced by the denominations or units in which rewards are counted; however this

might seem unlikely. What are the conditions on the families of utility functions and
EUT and PT frameworks for the decisions predicted to be unchanged by rescaling the

rewards/losses, once the model parameters have been inferred?

The fifth and last chapter will review some real world applications of the finite
mixture models developed by Glenn W. Harrison, E. Elisabet Rutstrom. One of the main

objectives of this study has been, all along, to construct the background concepts and
understanding necessary for a full appreciation of the application examples presented
in this chapter. This is done through four application cases. The first two cases are
practical overviews with the intension of introducing how the finite mixture models are

used for identifying subpopulations, and fitting them into their respective appropriate
mathematical models. The two cases presented are in the area of blood cell sampling

for diagnosis purposes, and in the field of astronomy investigation. Then, the more tech

nically involved section of this chapter starts with another application example in the
field of medical diagnosis. This application example exposes the technical aspects and

difficulties involved in the mathematical construction of the finite mixture models. It
lays out the mathematical heart of the finite mixture modeling. As such, through this
application example we see how the engine of the, finite mixture model is actually put

together. Finally, the fourth application example is in the field of consumer spending.
This application example addresses additional technical difficulties involving cases where
we don’t even know in advance how many subpopulations exist out there to be mod

eled. Building on the previous application example in the medical diagnosis field, and

by comparison to it, this consumer spending modeling application also illustrates other

important components of the finite mixture modeling process such as the procedure of

“Expectation Maximization”, commonly referred to as EM in the specialized literature
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Chapter 2

Decision Making Environments
This chapter reviews the important basic concepts such as decision making under
certainty, decision under uncertainty, decision making under risk, and utility functions,

used in this document. It will also review the desirable properties any theory of human
decision might want to have.
A general reference for this chapter will be [RT75], and [FH05],

Decision problems usually involve a finite number of alternatives. The tools used
to solve these problems depend basically on the type of context and their specific data.

The main families of context are:
1. Deterministic, or under certainty, involving mainly rational thinking,

2. > Uncertain, involving personal attitudes and feelings towards uncertainty,
3. Probabilistic, or under risk, involving theoretical modeling.
These three broad families of decision making situations have their own corre
sponding decision making tools. Yet, in the real world, any combination of these three

situations can be present and interacting among them. The next few pages of this docu
ment therefore introduces the decision making tools for each of these three situations.

2.1 Analytic Hierarchy Process, AHP.
The analytic hierarchy process involves rational thinking, and is used in deter
ministic situations where decision making takes place under certainty. The process of
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rational thinking needs to be constructed. Such construction converts the context of sub
jective judgment into its quantified translation, and therefore, made ready for rational
decision making. The first step is usually done through determination of weights in a

logical manner [FH05].

2.2 Determination of the Weights.
The objective of this step is to determine relative weights in order to obtain a
ranking among decision alternatives. For instance, dealing with 7i criteria arranged under

a given hierarchy, the procedure constructs an n x n pairwise comparison matrix, A. This
matrix quantifies the decision maker’s judgment regarding the relative importance of the

different criteria. This pairwise comparison ranks each criterion in row i (i = 1,2, ...,n)

relative to every other criterion as follows: Letting dij define the element (i,j) of A,
AHP uses a discrete scale from 1 to 9 in which a^ = 1 means that i and j are of equal

importance, a^ = 5 indicates that i is strongly more important than j, and a^ = 9 in
dicates that i is extremely more important than j. Other intermediate values between

1 and 9 are interpreted correspondingly. Obviously, a^ = k would automatically imply

that aji = 1/k. Also, all the diagonal elements an of A must equal 1, because they rank
a criterion against itself.
Example: Let us imagine a context where Location and Reputation of a town
play an important role in choosing it for an investment decision. Further, suppose that

we have a ranking analysis comparing three candidate towns of A, Y and Z as follows:
Reputation is strongly more important than the location, hence ai2 = 5. And

the corresponding comparison matrix is:
L

R

Normalizing A would give us the relative weights of R and L into a new matrix
N. This can be obtained by dividing the elements of each column by the sum of the

elements of the same column. Thus, to compute N, we divide the elements of columns 1

by (5 + 1 = 6) and those of column 2 by (1 4- | = 1.2).
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L
n=l(-17
Hy.83

R
-17Y

.83 J

The relative weights , Wr and wr, are then computed as the row average:
Wr =
= J7 Wr = .83^83 = <g3
The columns of N are identical, since the decision maker exhibits perfect consis
tency in specifying the entries of the comparison matrix A. These relative weights with
respect to Location versus Reputation will be used for the final Decision Mating calcula

tion. At this point, we need to compare the relative importance of Location among the
three towns, as well as the relative importance of Reputation among them. Matrices Arand A# compare these two sets of relative importance.
Within each of the two criteria Location and Reputation, the relative importance

among the three towns, are given by the decision makers best judgment as follows: The
relative importance of location for the towns X, Y, and Z are respectively 1,2 and 5. For

their Reputation, these relative numbers are respectively 1, 1/2, and 1/3.

Expressed into Ar and Ar we obtain:
X
X i 1

Y

Z

1
2

n

Ar = Y

2

1

1
2

z

V

2

V

X

Y

z

X P

2

3\

Ar = Y

1
2

1

3
2

z

VI

2
3

1/

Adding the columns, we get: AL-column sum = (8, 3.5, 1.7) A/i-column sum
= (1.83, 3.67, 5.5) Then normalizing through division of all the entries by the respective
column-sums, we obtain:
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Z

Y

X

.143

.118 \

.250

.286

z \.625

.571

.294
.588 )

X <.125

NL= Y

X Z.545

Z

Y

X

.545

.545 \

Nr= Y

.273

.273

.273

z

.182

.182

.182 )

Calculating the corresponding row averages, we get:
WLA =
WLB

=

.125+.143+.11S = 129
.250+.286+.294
3
.625+.571+.588 _

WRA =

.545+.545+.54S = 545
-273+.273+.273 = 273

.277

WRB =

594

wRC - -182+-182+-182 = .182

Thus, the Location weights, and Reputation weights for the towns X, Y, and Z
can be summarized as follows:
Criterion
Location
Reputation

Town y Town Z
.277
.594
.273
.182

Town X
.129
.545

Sum
1
1

And finally, using the normalized relative weights WR= .17 and WR~ .83 cal
culated at the beginning, the final ranking among the three candidate towns can now be

obtained by:
Rank
X
Y
Z

=

Weight
.17
.17
.17

X
X
X
X

Location
.129
.277
.594

Town X wins the investment decision.

+
+
+
+

Weight
.83
.83
.83

X
X
X
X

Reputation
.545
.273
.182

= .4743
= .2737
= .2520
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2.3

Decision under Uncertainty
Under uncertainty, the payoffs depend on the random states of nature [FH05].

The payoff matrix of a decision problem with m alternative actions and n states of nature
can be represented as:

si
ai / u(ai,si)

S2

sn •

v(ui,s2) • ■ •

v(ai,Sn)

v(a2,si)

v(a2,s2)...

v(a2,sn)

a2

flm.

v(am, s2) • ■ •

sn) /

where the elements Oi stand for action i, and the element Sj for state of nature j. The
payoff associated with action a-L and state Sj is v(ai,Sj). These payoff value elements

v (ai, Sj) are known in advance for every state of the nature.

Making a decision under risk involves probability, whereas in the case of uncer
tainty, the probability distribution associated with the states Sj,j = 1,2,

is either

unknown or cannot be determined,
This lack of information has led to the development of the following alternative

strategies for analyzing the decision problem [RT75]:
1. Laplace,

2. Minimax,
3. Savage regret,

4. Hurwicz.
These strategies differ in how conservative the decision maker is when facing
uncertainty.

The Laplace criterion uses the principle of insufficient reason. Since the prob

ability distribution for the states of nature is not known, the alternatives are simply
evaluated using the optimistic assumption that all states are equally likely to occur,
meaning: P {si} = P {s2} = ... = F{sn} =

Given v (a$, Sj) > 0, the best alternative
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is the one that yields

max
i

If v(a,i, sj) < 0, then minimization replaces maximization.

The minimax (maximin) criterion is a conservative attitude of making the best
of the worst possible conditions. Therefore the decision maker uses:

min max v (ai, Sj)
i
j

when v (a$, Sj) < 0,

max mint> (a^ Sj)

when v (ai, Sj) > 0.

The Savage regret criterion tries to moderate the conservatism in the minimax
(maximin) criterion by replacing the (gain or loss) payoff matrix v (ai, Sj) with a loss (or

regret) r (ai, Sj) matrix, using the following transformation:
I v (ai, Sj) — min{v (a
,
*
s^)}, if v is loss
r (a^ Sj) = <
k
I max{v (a^, Sj)} — v (ai, Sj), if vis gain
X k
For instance, consider the minimax criterion in the following loss matrix, where
the unsigned elements of the matrix represent losses. Without the regret matrix, in this

case, one would select a2, but when applied to the regret matrix, a± will be selected

instead.
In fact, in the case of minimax we have:

51
ai / $11,000

$90

a2 y$10,000

$10,000

52

But, converting to its corresponding regret matrix, we get:
si

ai / $1,000

a2 y

$0

52

$0

\

$9,910y

The Hurwicz criterion is designed to let a parameter a fit the decision-making
attitudes into ranges going from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic (or conser

vative). Assuming v(&i,Sj) represents gain, define 0 < a < 1. Then the selected action
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must be associated with
max < amaxr (o$, sA + (1 — a) mint’ (a$, Sj)
i (
j
3

The parameter a is called the index of optimism. When ct = 0, the criterion
is conservative because it applies the regular minimax criterion. If a = 1, the criterion

produces optimistic results because it seeks the best of the best conditions. The proper
selection of the value of a would therefore indicate the degree or the index of optimism

desired. In the absence of strong feeling regarding optimism and pessimism, a = .5 may
be an appropriate choice. If v (a,i, Sj) represents loss, then the criterion is changed to

min < ciminv (o^, sA 4- (1 — a) maxt (of, Sj)
i { 3
3
Finally, another variation of decision making environment is situations in which

two intelligent opponents with conflicting objectives are trying to outdo one another.
Game theory best models these situations where aiming at the best out of the worst

conditions available is the main concern. Typical examples include advertising campaigns
for competing products and planning strategies for warring armies.

The so called players of the game will each have a finite or infinite number of
alternatives or strategies. Such games are known as two-person zero-sum games because
a gain by one player signifies an equal loss to the other.

A payoff is associated with each pair of strategies, which is what one player
receives from the other. It suffices, then, to summarize the game in terms of the payoff to
one player. Designating the two players as A and B with m and n strategies, respectively,
the game is usually represented by the payoff matrix to player A as:

Bi

B2...

Bn

Ai

on

012

■

Oln

A.2

O21

022 • • •

O2n

Om2 • •

Omn /

Am

This representation indicates that if A uses strategy i and B uses strategy j, the
payoff to A is ay, which means that the payoff to B is — aij.
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2.4

Probabilistic, or Decision Making under Risk Situa
tions.
Decision making under risk is based on the expected value criterion because in

this situation each decision alternative is described by a probability distribution. Maxi
mizing the expected profit or minimizing the expected loss can be achieved here through

the formation of decision trees, themselves subjected to utility functions.
Under conditions of risk, the payoffs associated with each decision alternative
are described by probability distributions. For this reason, decision making under risk

can be based on the expected value criterion, in which decision alternatives are compared

based on the maximization of expected profit or the minimization of expected cost.
The probabilities used in the expected value criterion are usually determined
from historical data. These probabilities may need to be adjusted using additional sam

pling or experimentation. The resulting probabilities are referred to as posterior (or
Bayes) probabilities, as opposed to the prior probabilities determined from raw data. In

practice, there usually are cases where the utility rather than the real value should be
used in the analysis. This is done through utility functions.
2.4.1

Utility Functions.

The determination of the utility is subjective [Cen06]. Suppose there is a 50-50
chance that a $20,000 investment will produce a net profit of $40,000 or be lost completely.
The associated expected profit is 40,000 x .5 — 20,000x.5 = $10,000. Although there is

a net expected profit of $10,000, an investor who is willing to accept risk may undertake
the investment for a 50% chance to make a $40,000 profit. Conversely, a conservative

investor may not be willing to risk losing $20,000. Thus, we say that different individuals
exhibit different attitudes towards risk, meaning that individuals exhibit different utility

regarding risk.

The determination of utility therefore depends on one’s attitude toward accept
ing risk. Let’s see how a utility function can take the place of real money: In the preceding
investment example, the best payoff is $40,000, and the worst is -$20,000. We thus estab

lish an arbitrary, but logical, utility scale, U. from 0 to 100, in which U (- $20,000) = 0
and U ($40,000) = 100. We can define the Utility Function for this example as follows: If
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the decision makers attitude is indifferent toward risk, then the resulting utility function

will be a straight line joining (0,-$20,000) and (100, $40,000).

Figure 2.1: Utility Function for Risk Averse (X), Indifferent (F), and Risk Seeker (Z)

Decision Makers
In this case, both the real money and its utility will produce the same decisions.

More realistically, the utility function takes over forms that reflect the attitude of the

decision maker toward risk. Figure 2.1 illustrates the cases of individuals X, Y, and Z.

Individual X is risk-averse because of exhibiting higher sensitivity to loss than to profit.
Individual Z is the opposite, and hence is a risk-seeker. The figure demonstrates that for
the risk averse individual, X, the drop in utility be corresponding to a loss of $10,000 is

larger than the increase ab associated with a gain of $10,000. For the same ± $10,000
changes, the risk seeker, Z, exhibits an opposite behavior because de > ef. Further,

individual Y is risk neutral because the suggested changes yield equal changes in utility.
In general, an individual may be both risk averse and risk seeking, in which case

the associated utility curve will follow an elongated S-shape.

Utility curves similar to the ones demonstrated in the above figure are deter
mined by quantifying the decision maker’s attitude toward risk for different levels of cash
money. In our example, the desired range is -$20,000 to $40,000, and the corresponding
utility range is 0 to 100. What we would like to do is specify the utility associated with

intermediate cash values, such as -$10,000, $0, $10,000, $20,000, and $30,000. The proce
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dure starts by establishing a lottery for a cash amount x whose expected utility is given

as:
U (x) = pU (-20,000) + (1 - p) U ($40,000),

0<p< 1

= 0p+100 (1-p)

= 100 - lOOp.
To determine U (x), we ask the decision maker to state a preference between a
guaranteed cash amount x and the chance to play a lottery in which a loss of $20,000

occurs with probability p, and a profit of $40,000 is realized with probability 1 — p. The

decision maker translates the preference by specifying the value of p that will render him

indifferent between the two choices. For example, if x = $20,000, the decision maker may
say that a guaranteed $20,000 cash and the lottery are equally attractive if p = .8. In this

case, we can compute the utility of x = $20,000 as U ($20,000) = 100 — 100 x .8 = 20.
We continue in this manner until we generate enough points [x , U (a?)] to identify
the shape of the utility function. We may then determine the desired utility function using

regression analysis or simply by using a piecewise-linear function.

Although we are using a quantitative procedure to determine the utility function,
the approach is far from being scientific. The fact that the procedure is entirely driven by
the contributed opinion of the decision maker casts doubt on the reliability of the process.
In particular, the procedure implicitly assumes that the decision maker is rational. But,

this requirement that cannot always be reconciled with the wide changes in behavior and
mood that typify human beings. In this regard, decision makers should take the concept

i of utility in the broad sense that monetary values should not be the only critical factor

in decision making (see [FH05], Chapter 13).
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Chapter 3

Expected Utility Theory Versus
Prospect Theory
The two major decision theories that have undertaken to model human decision
making processes are the Expected Utility Theory, and the Prospect Theory [DK79].
In Chapter 2 we saw the three major situations where decision making takes

place. Also, we have analyzed the utility function as the basic tool used in the third
situation, that of decision making under risk. The Expected Utility Theory, EUT, and the

Prospect Theory, PT, have both used the concept of utility function [Cen06]. Although
the Expected Utility Theory, EUT, has used this basic approach presented in the previous

chapter as its backbone, it has considerably enriched the concept of utility function and

has constructed specific expected utility functions that can be used in modeling data
pertaining to different real world situations. While doing so, the expected utility has

also raised important questions, especially in the areas where it has failed to realistically
explain the actual human decision making behaviors. As we will see in the second half
of this chapter, the Prospect Theory has been trying to identify and remedy EUT’s

shortcomings. At this point let’s begin by asking the following question: What are the
desirable properties any theory of human decision making might want to have? In the

following section we illustrate the approach adopted by the Expected Utility Theory.
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3.1

Expected Utility Theory
This theory essentially assumes that human decisions are taken based on ratio

nal analyses. The ingredients of this rationality are formalized by the Expected Utility

Theory. These assumptions constitute the heart of EUT. Interestingly, we will see how
EUT’s assumptions do not fit into the moods and attitudes of real human beings. In fact,
most of EUT’s assumptions will end up either being adjusted or plainly replaced by the

components of the prospect theory’s decision making model. The Prospect Theory will
then be capable of better explaining and modeling the process of human decision making

in many situations.
This third chapter therefore includes examples of utility theory and details its

specific failures. In this section we will show, for instance, that the Expected Utility

Theory being true for any utility function is equivalent to a set of axioms: the Von-

Neumann Morgenstern axioms. In fact, as we will see, the Prospect Theory initially
noted that some of these Von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms are not empirically true:

people just don’t make decisions like that. The relation between the curvature of the
utility function and risk aversion will be further analyzed at this point.

■The next section then shows the remedies suggested by the Prospect Theory
before assessing this same theory’s limitations and extensions. For instance, a short

section will show that important properties of the Prospect Theory such as first order
stochastic dominance, and transitivity come into play only when there are more than

2 outcomes. Additionally, cumulative Prospect Theory, which is the most theoretically

sound formulation of PT because it respects stochastic dominance and transitivity, is
mostly useful when there is a continuum of outcomes.

3.1.1

The Expected Utility Property
A utility function u is seen as having the expected utility property if, for a

gamble g with prospects ai,

..., an, with effective probabilitiesPi,P2i -^Pn respectively,

we have: u(g) = pi«(ai) +^2^(02) +

Fpnu(an) where u(a.i) is the decision-maker’s

utility for prospect ai. Definition: An individual who chooses one gamble over another if

and only if its expected utility is higher is called an expected utility maximizer.

The main contribution of Von-Neumann and Morgenstern is to prove that, in

order for a utility function to exist, and to fulfill the expected utility property, all the
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preference axioms must be respected (adapted from [Cen06]).

The Preference Axioms Before we construct examples of utility functions over lotter

ies, or gambles, we need to make the following assumptions on decision makers’ pref
erences. In these examples > designates the binary preference relation “is weakly

preferred to”, which would include both “strictly preferred to”, and “indifferent to”.

Completeness For 2 given gambles g and g( in G, either g < g! or g > g'. Meaning,
people have preferences over all lotteries, and rank them all.

Transitivity For 3 gambles g, gf, and g" in G, if g > g' and gl > g>(, then g > g". In

English, if g is preferred (or indifferent) to g!, and gf is preferred (or indifferent) to
g,!, then g is preferred (or indifferent) to g'!.

Continuity Mathematically, this assumption claims that the upper and lower contour
sets of a preference relation over lotteries or gamble are closed. In conjunction with
the other axioms, continuity is needed in order to ensure that for any gamble in G,

there exists some probability where the decision-maker is indifferent between the

’’best” versus the ’’worst” outcome. This might seem irrational if the best outcome

was, for instance, $1,000, and the worst outcome was to be run over by a truck.
However, one could expect that most rational people would be willing to travel
across town to collect a $1,000 prize, even if this might involve some probability of
being run over by a truck.

Monotonicity This ugly word simply means that a lottery which assigns a higher proba

bility to a preferred prospect will be preferred to one that assigns a lower probability

to a preferred prospect, as long as the other prospects in the lottery remain un

changed. In this case, we are referring to a strict preference over prospects, and
do not consider the case where the decision-maker would be indifferent between

possible outcomes.
Substitution If a decision-maker is already indifferent between two possible prospects,

then they will be indifferent between two gambles which offer them equal proba

bilities, should the gambles be identical in every other way, meaning the outcomes
can, therefore, be substituted. Thus, if outcomes x and y are indifferent, then one

would be indifferent between a lottery giving x with the probability p, and z with
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the probability (1—p), and a lottery yielding y with the probability p, and z with

the probability (1—p). Much the same way, if x is preferred to y, then a lottery

yielding x with the probability p, and z with the probability (1—p), is preferred to

a lottery yielding y with the probability p, and z with the probability (1— p). This
last axiom is usually referred to as the Independence axiom, because it refers to the

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This last axiom allows us to reduce
compound prospects to simple prospects, since one can also be indifferent between
a simple lottery yielding an outcome a: with a probability p, and a compound lottery

where the prize might yet be another lottery ticket, allowing one to take part in a

lottery with £ as a possible reward, such that the effective probability of obtaining

x would be p.

3.1.2 Human Decision Making Behaviors Inconsistent with the Ex
pected Utility Theory
In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky conducted a series of experiments

testing the Allais Paradox in Israel, at the University of Stockholm, and at the University
of Michigan [GII08]. Everywhere the results produced the same pattern. The problem was

even framed in many different manners, with prizes involving money, travels, vacation,
and so on. In every case, the substitution axiom was violated in exactly the same pattern.

Kahnemann and Tversky called this pattern the certainty effect. This would mean that
people overweight outcomes which are certain, compared to outcomes which are merely

probable. Using the term ’’prospect” to designate a set of outcomes with a probability
distribution over them, Kahnemann and Tversky also state that whenever winning is
possible but not probable, meaning when probabilities are very low, most people choose
the prospect which offers the larger gain. This fact is illustrated by the second decision
stage of the Allais Paradox. Generalizing, if x and y were outcomes with 0 < p,q,r < 1,

where p, q, and r would refer to probabilities, then they state that:

(v,pq)
means a prospect.

(re,p) => (y,pqr) > (x,pr)-, where the term (outcome, probability)
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The Reflection Effect

Kahnemann and Tversky also discovered strong evidence of what they called
the reflection effect. To illustrate the reflection effect: Imagine a typical Allais Paradox

problem, framed in the following manner. You first have to choose one of the two gam
bles, or prospects: Gamble A: A 100% probability of losing $3000. Gamble B: An 80%
chance of losing $4000, and a 20% probability of losing nothing. Next, you will have to
choose between: Gamble C: A 100% probability of receiving $3000. Gamble D: An 80%
probability of receiving $4000, and a 20% probability of receiving nothing. Kahnemann

and Tversky discovered that 20% of people actually chose D, while 92% would chose

B. A similar pattern was observed not only for varying positive, but also for negative
prizes. This led them to conclude that for decision problems involving possible losses,
people’s preferences over negative prospects are often a mirror image of their preferences
over positive prospects. In other words, the same way they are risk-verse over prospects

involving gains, people often become risk-loving when prospects involve losses [NB07].
Combination of the Certainty and Reflection Effects
In case of positive prospects, the certainty effect results in a risk-averse pref

erence for a sure gain, rather than a gain which might be larger but merely probable.
However, in case of negative prospects, symmetrically, people adopt risk-loving prefer

ences for larger losses which remain probable, over smaller but certain losses. At this
point, one would imagine that if this observation held universally then one would never

see people buying insurance. Yet, what this really means, as we will see again in the

section on probability transformations, is that when losses are involved with moderate
or high probabilities, then risk seeking is often predicted. Prospect theory does, in fact,

predict risk-aversion behavior for small-probability losses, which is normally the case in
insurance decisions.
The Isolation Effect
Imagine now another lottery problem. Having to choice between the following,

which one would you choose? Gamble A: A 25% chance of winning $3000. Gamble B:
A 20% chance of winning $4000, and an 80% chance of winning nothing. Now imagine

having to make a decision in a two-stage problem. The first stage involves a probability of
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0.75 for ending the game without losing nor winning anything, and a probability of 0.25
for moving to the second stage, where you are to face with the following choice: Gamble C:

A 100% probability of winning $3000. Gamble D\ An 80% probability of winning $4000,
and a 20% probability of winning nothing. 65% of people would chose B. while 78%

would chose C. Why would this seem surprising? In fact, the true probabilities involved
in the second choice can be rewritten as: 0.25 x 1 = 0.25 probability of winning $3000,
and 0.25 x 0.8 = 0.2 probability of winning $4000. Kahnemann and Tver sky interpreted

this discovery in the following terms: When simplifying the choice between alternatives,
people usually disregard components that are shared among, and only focus on those

which distinguish them. Because different choice problems can often be decomposed in

different ways, this could lead to inconsistent preferences, as seen above. Kahnemann
and Tversky called this phenomenon the isolation effect.

The above discoveries about the human decision making behavior are inconsis
tent with the purely rational assumptions made by the Expected Utility Theory. There

fore, one would need another explicative model which would better fit the contours of the

human soul. This is precisely what The Prospect Theory has the ambition to accomplish.

3.2

The Prospect Theory
Given the effects presented above, Kahneman and Tversky suggested a new

theory of decision-making under risk, which they called Prospect Theory (see [Wik09],
and [DK79]). Prospect Theory differs from Expected Utility Theory in many fundamental

ways. Firstly, it distinguishes two phases in the decision-making process: An editing
phase, which represents a preliminary analysis of the offered prospects, followed by an

evaluation phase, where the prospect perceived as the highest value is chosen among the

edited prospects.

3.2.1 The Editing Phase
In the editing phase, a decision-maker reorganizes and reformulates the available

options, in an effort to simplify the choice. It consists of the following operations (adapted

from [Cen06]):
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Coding People perceive prospects as gains or losses, as seen in the above examples, as

opposed to final states of wealth or welfare. A gain or loss is, therefore, defined in
comparison with some reference point. The location of the reference point affects

whether the outcomes are coded as gains or as losses.
Combination Prospects are simplified by combining the probabilities associated with

identical outcomes. For instance, the prospect (200, 0.25; 200, 0.25), meaning
having two consecutive 25% chances of winning 200 dollars, will be reduced to
(200, 0.5). In this example the subject is expected to choose between a prospect
where a 25% chance of winning 200 dollars is offered twice in a row, versus some

other prospect not mentioned here. Therefore, before even considering the other

prospect, the Combination component of the Editing Phase would add the two
consecutive 25% chances of winning 200 dollars, by a 50% chance of winning 200

dollars.
Segregation The riskless part of any prospect is separated from its risky part. For in

stance, the prospect (300, 0.8; 200, 0.2) is decomposed into a sure component of
200 and a risky prospect (100, 0.8). A similar process is applied for losses.

The above editing operations are applied to each prospect separately. Whereas, the
following are applied to combinations of two or more prospects:

Simplification Prospects are exposed to be rounded off. For example, a prospect of

(101, 0.49) could be seen as a 50-50 chance to win 100 dollars. Also, extremely
unlikely outcomes could just be discarded.
Identification of Dominance Outcomes that are strictly dominated are identified and
rejected without further evaluation.

Note that some editing operations would allow or prevent others from being
carried out. The sequence of editing operations could often vary with the offered setting

and the format of the display. As we can imagine, many preference anomalies can arise
from the act of editing. For instance, inconsistencies described by the isolation effect,
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would result from the cancellation of common components. Also, intransitivity cases can

result from a simplification that would eliminate small differences between prospects.

3.2.2 The Evaluation Phase
During the evaluation phase, an individual examines all the available prospects
and chooses the one perceived to represent the highest value. The overall value of a

prospect, V, is expressed in terms of two scales, 7r and v. The first scale,

tt,

associates

some decision weight 7r(p) with each probability p. This would reflect the impact of p on
the global value of the prospect. It is important to mention that 7r is not a probability

measure. Also, Kahneman and Tversky prove that %(p) + 7r(l — p) is frequently less than
1. The second scale, v, assigns a number v(x) to each outcome x. This would reflect

the subjective value of that outcome. Recalling that outcomes are defined relative to a

reference point, used as a zero point, v measures deviations from that reference point.

Considering a simple prospect of the form

where the subject would win x

with probability p, y with probability q. and nothing with probability 1 — p — q, and
where p 4- q < 1, we say: An offered prospect is strictly positive if its outcomes are all
positive. Meaning (x, p; y. q) where x, y > 0 and p + q = 1. It is strictly negative when

all its outcomes are negative. It is regular when it is neither strictly positive, nor strictly
negative. Therefore, for a regular prospect, where either p 4- q < 1, or, x <0 <y, we

would'have: V(x,p\y,q) = ir(p)v(x) 4-

where n(0) = 0,7r(0) = 0, and 7r(l) = 1.

V is defined on prospects, whereas v is defined on outcomes. The evaluation of strictly
positive or strictly negative prospects would follow a different rule, described below: If
p 4- q = 1, where either x > y > 0, or x < y < 0, then:

V(x,p;y,q) — v(y) 4- tf(p)[v(^) — f(y)], so that the value of a strictly positive
or strictly negative prospect will equal the value of the riskless component augmented by
the difference between the values of the two outcomes, multiplied by the weight assigned

to the more extreme outcome. Note that a decision weight is only applied to the risky
component, not to the riskless one.

For example: V(400,0.25; 100,0.75) = v(100) 4- 7r(0.25)[v(400) — v(100)J Meaning that a
decision weight is only applied to the difference in value v(x)—v(y), but not to the riskless
component, v(100). Also note that the right side of the equation above is simplified to

ir(p)v(x) + [1 — 7r(p)]f (p)- This, in turn, reduces to 7r(p)v(a;) -\-n(q)v(y), the equation for
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a regular prospect, when 7r(p) + 7r(l — p) = 1. However, this is usually not satisfied.
While the Prospect Theory equations might appear to resemble those of the

Expected Utility Theory, their crucial differences are:

1. Values are attached to changes with respect to reference point, rather than to final
states, and
2. The decision weights do not need to coincide with probabilities.

3.3

Additional Observations on Value Functions
The focus on changes as the carriers of value shall not mean that the value of a

particular change is totally independent of the initial position. In fact, value functions can
become more linear with increases in assets. A change going from $100 to $200 would
likewise have a much higher value than one from $1100 to $1200. The value function
is, in fact, concave above the reference point (v"(x) < 0 for x > 0), and convex below

it

> 0 for x < 0). Meaning, it is concave for gains but convex for losses. For

instance, most people do not like symmetric gambles of the type (50,0.5; -50,0.5). Thus,

if x > y > 0, then (y, 0.5; —y, 0.5) will be preferred to (x, 0.5; — x, 0.5). This would mean
that u(y) +v(—y) > v(x) +v(—x). Letting y = 0 gives us v(x) < —v(—x), while letting y

approach x gives vf(x) < v'(—x), as long as v remains differentiable. Therefore the value
function for losses would be steeper than that for gains.

Thus, for instance, choosing between the prospect of winning or losing $100 with
a 50% chance in either case, expressed as (100,0.5 ; -100,0.5) against another prospect

of win or lose, but this time on $10,000 and with the same 50% chance in either case,

expressed as (10000,0.5 ; -10000,0.5), most people would choose the first prospect where
the exposure is only a loss of $100. Yet, from the strict viewpoint of the EUT assumptions

the two prospects are equivalent with their respective Utilities equal to 0.
Remark on the weighting function: The weighting function 7r, which associates

decision weights to given probabilities, is an increasing function of p, where 7r(0) = 0 and
7r(l) = 1. However, people usually overweight very small probabilities, like 0.001, so that

7r(p) > p in cases of very small p.
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Definition 1. In probability and statistics theory, a stochastic order quantifies the concept

of a random variable being “larger” than another. These are often partial orders, so that

one random variable A might be neither stochastically larger than, less than, nor equal to
another random variable B. Many different orders exist, and have different applications.

A real random variable A is said to be less than a real random variable B in the
“usual stochastic order” if

> x) < p(B > x) for all x G (—00,00).

Definition 2. Stochastic dominance is a type of stochastic ordering. The term is used in
decision theory and decision analysis in order to refer to situations where one prospect,
can be ranked as superior to another prospect. It is based on preferences regarding the

outcomes. A preference may be a simple ranking of outcomes from the most to the least

favored, or it may also use a value measure, meaning a number associated with each
outcome which allows comparison of multiples between one outcome and another outcome,

such as two instances of winning a dollar versus one instance of winning two dollars. Only
limited knowledge of preferences is needed for determining dominance. Risk aversion,

using this definition, is therefore a factor in second order stochastic dominance only.
In our comparison of Expected Utility Theory versus the Prospect Theory, the

first order stochastic order and stochastic dominance are only mathematically modeled

by the EUT. Whereas the PT identifies, defines, and uses human interpretations of the
otherwise pure quantitative values, in order to re-establish stochastic order and dominance

that better fit and explain human decision making behaviors.
Definition 3. Statewise dominance. The simplest case of stochastic dominance is state

wise dominance, also referred to as state-by-state dominance, defined as follows: Prospect
A is statewise dominant over prospect B if A yields a better outcome compared to B in
every possible state. More precisely, A would yield at least as good an outcome in every

state, with strict inequality in at least one state. For instance, if a dollar is added to

one or more prizes in a lottery, then the new lottery would statewise dominate the old
one. Similarly, if a risk insurance policy offers a lower premium and a better coverage
than another policy, then with or without damage, the outcome will be better. In simple

terms, anyone who prefers more to less, or said in formal terminology, anyone having
monotonically increasing preferences, will always prefer the statewise dominant prospect.
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In our comparison of EUT versus PT, the feature of statewise dominance is
assumed to be true and operational by the EUT whereas the PT may easily accept to

ignore it through the Editing step of its Utility Function.

3.3.1

First-Order Stochastic Dominance
Statewise dominance is a special case of the first-order stochastic dominance.

First order dominance is defined as follows: Prospect A has first-order stochastic dom
inance over prospect B if for any outcome x, A yields at least as high a probability of

winning at least x as does B, and for some x, A yields a higher probability of winning at
least x. In notation form, p(A > x) > p(B > x) for all x, and, p(A > x) > p(B > x), for
some x [Wik09]. Now, let us define Fa and Fb as the cumulative distribution functions of
the prospects. In terms of the cumulative distribution functions of the two prospects, A

dominates B, means that Fa(x) > Fb(x) for all x, with strict inequality for some x. For
instance, consider a die toss where 1 through 3 would win $1 and 4 through 6 would win

$2 in prospect B. This is dominated by a prospect A that yields $3 for 4 through 6 and
$1 for 1 through 3, and also dominated by a prospect C which yields $2 for 3 through

6 and $1 for 1 and 2. Prospect A would, in this case, have statewise dominance over

B if we re-order the values won by the die toss outcomes, whereas prospect C will keep

first-order stochastic dominance over B, and without statewise dominance, no matter
what the order of prospects. Further, although whenever A dominates B, the expected
value of the payoff in A is greater than the expected value of the payoff in B, this is not a
sufficient condition for dominance, and thus, one cannot order lotteries using the concept

of stochastic dominance simply by comparing their probability distribution means.

Every expected utility maximizer with an increasing utility function will prefer
gamble A over gamble B if and only if A first-order stochastically dominates B. But
then again, the concept of expected utility maximizer is a necessary assumption for EUT,

whereas the PT at the cost of loosing some coherence provides for deviation even from the
first-order stochastic dominance [NB07]. In fact, we will see in the following chapter the
extent to which the human behavior in decision making for a subpopulation can deviate

from the EUT model, in which case EUT would then apply only to the other portion of

the population. Modeling these disparities .is exactly the motivation behind the mixture
theories that we are analyzing in the following chapter.
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3.3.2

Second-Order Stochastic Dominance
The other commonly used type of stochastic dominance is second-order stochas

tic dominance. Roughly speaking, for two gambles A and B, gamble A has second-order

stochastic dominance over gamble B if A is more predictable, meaning involves less risk,
and has at least as high a mean. All risk-averse expected-utility maximizers (that is,

those with increasing and concave utility functions) prefer a second-order stochastically
dominant gamble to a dominated gamble. The same is true for non-expected utility
maximizers with utility functions that are locally concave.

For an example, let’s compare the die toss gamble A as seen previously, with
the gamble B respectively as follows:

Gamble A
Probability
Exp. Utility
Gamble B
Probability
Exp. Utility

$1
1/6
$1/6
-$1
1/6
-$l/6

$1
1/6
M/6
$1
1/6
$1/6

$1
1/6
$1/6
$2
1/6
$2/6

$2
1/6
$2/6
$2
1/6
$2/6

$2
1/6
$2/6
$2
1/6
$2/6

$2
1/6
$2/6
$3
1/6
$3/6

£-i.o
£ = 1.5

E = i-o
E = 1.5

Note that the Expected Utility of prospect A = $1.50, while that of prospect B

also carries a the total Expected Utility of $1.50.
Yet, gamble B will be dominated by the gamble A, because, as we have seen previously, the

$-1 which represents a possible loss of 1 dollar, is perceived as involvement in additional
risk involved in the gamble B. compared to the gamble A.
Using cumulative distribution functions Fa and Fr, A second-order stochasti

cally dominates over B if and only if the area under Fa from minus infinity to x is greater
than or equal to the area under Fr from minus infinity to x for all real numbers x, with

strict inequality for some x.
For an example, let us consider the gamble C, compared to the gamble D both
laid out below [WikOO]. In this example we are using discrete measures, but the example

illustrates the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of Fc and Fr, and shows the

dominance of D over C.
Gamble C
Probability
Exp. Utility
CDF

-$2
1/12
-$2/12
-$2/12

-$1
0/12
$0
-$2/12

$1
5/12
$5/12
$3/12

$2
4/12
$8/12
$11/12

$3
1/12
$3/12
$14/12

$4
1/12
$4/12
$18/12

£ = 1.0
£ = 1-5
£ = 1.5

26

Gamble D will dominate gamble C if and only if its Cumulative Distribution
Function, meaning its cumulative densities provided by the last line CDF dominates that
of the gamble C in at least one area.

Gamble D
Probability
Exp. Utility
CDF

-$2
1/12
-$2/12
-$2/12

-$1
0/12
$0
-$2/12

$1.2
5/12
$6/12
$4/12

$7/4
4/12
$7/12
$11/12

$3
1/12
$3/12
$14/12

$4
1/12
$4/12
$18/12

£ = i.o
£ = 1.5
£ = 1-5

Thus gamble D dominates gamble B since Fq, the CDF for D is greater or
equal to Fc for all x, and strictly greater at x = $1.2.

3.3.3

Cumulative Prospect Theory
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) is a model to describe decisions under risk

which has been introduced by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in 1992 [DK79].
CPT is therefore a further development and a variant of Prospect Theory. Its main

difference compared to the original version of Prospect Theory is that the weighting
is applied to the cumulative probability distribution function, as it also is the case in

rank-dependent Expected Utility Theory, rather than to the probability distributions of
individual outcomes. For his contributions to behavioral economics, and specially for his
development of the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), Daniel Kahneman has received

the prize in Economic Sciences in 2002.
Outline of the Model
(Adapted from [Wik09]) The value function both in Prospect Theory and in

Cumulative Prospect Theory, is based on a reference point. This is in contrast with the
Expected Utility Theory which deals with final outcomes. The reference point in PT and

CPT corresponds to what the subjects perceive as the breakpoint between losing and

winning. In Figure 3.1, we can see that the reference point is placed at the origin. This
figure also shows that the slope on the negative side is sharper than on the positive side,
corresponding to the loss prospects looming more than prospects of gain.

.Figure 3.1 shows a typical value function in Prospect Theory and Cumulative

Prospect Theory. It assigns values to possible outcomes of a lottery. On the other hand,
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Figure 3.1: A Typical Value Function for Prospect Theory and Cumulative Prospect

Theory
a typical weighting function in the Cumulative Prospect Theory, represented graphically

by Figure 3.2, overweights both ends of the probability distribution, not due to the over

weighing of very small and very large probabilities, but instead, due to the relative values
that usually coincide with those probabilities.

Figure 3.2: Typical Weighting Function in Cumulative Prospect Theory
Figure 3.2 is a typical weighting function in Cumulative Prospect Theory [MA07].
It transforms objective cumulative probabilities into subjective cumulative probabilities.

To summarize, the main observation of CPT, and its predecessor Prospect Theory, is that
people usually think of possible outcomes relative to a certain reference point, often the
status quo, rather than based on to the final status. This phenomenon is called the fram

ing effect. Moreover, people have different risk attitudes towards gains, meaning simply
towards outcomes above the reference point, compared to their attitudes towards losses,
or outcomes below the reference point. In essence, people feel generally more strongly
about potential losses than they do about potential gains. And finally, people in CPT
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tend to overweight extreme, and unlikely, prospects, while they underweight “average”
prospects. This would mean, for example, that both small amounts in a lottery prospect

as well as the very large amounts, at the other end will be overweighted, while most people

would underweight the intermediary amounts. This last point is in contrast to Prospect
Theory which assumes that people overweight unlikely events, without regard to where in
the spectrum of amounts they are located. Thus, CPT incorporates these facts in a mod
ification of Expected Utility Theory by replacing final wealth with outcomes relative to a

reference point, replacing the utility function by a value function that depends on relative
outcomes, and replacing cumulative probability distributions with weighted cumulative
probability distributions. In the general case, this can be represented by the following

formula for the subjective utility of a risky outcome described by the probability measure

P-

where v is the value function, whose typical form was shown in Figure 3.1, and w is the
weighting function, as graphed in Figure 3.2. In this formula, F(x) :=

dp, represents

the integral of the probability densities over all values up to x, thus it is the cumulative

probability. It is what we have been referring to as cumulative probability densities. The
function w, therefore, represents the twist that the decision maker’s subjective perceptions
inflict to F(x) rather than to the individual probabilities. This formula generalizes the

original formulation by Tversky and Kahneman from finitely many distinct outcomes to

infinite, and therefore continuous, outcomes.
The main modification to Prospect Theory is that, as in rank-dependent Ex
pected Utility Theory, cumulative probability distributions are transformed, rather than
the probabilities themselves. This takes us to the overweighting of extreme events which

occur only at both ends, carrying for instance very small or very large outcomes, with
small probabilities, rather than to an overweighting of every small probability regardless

of outcome values. The modification helps to avoid the violation of first order stochastic

dominance by the PT, and makes the generalization to arbitrary outcome distributions

easier. CPT is therefore from a theoretical standpoint an improvement over Prospect
Theory (See [Wik09]).
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Chapter 4

Finite Mixture Models
This chapter analyzes the more recent models developed by Glenn W. Harri

son, E. Elisabet Rutstrom in 2008. These authors suggest that a finite mixture model
can be used to estimate the parameters of each decision process while simultaneously

estimating the probability that each theory applies to the sample. We will then look at

scale independence of these models: Do behavioral predictions of these models depend

on the denomination/units of the rewards/losses? It could be that peoples’ decisions are
influenced by the denominations or units in which rewards are counted; however this

might seem unlikely. What are the conditions on the families of utility functions and
EUT and PT frameworks for the decisions predicted to be unchanged by rescaling the
rewards/losses, once the model parameters have been inferred?

A finite mixture model can be used to estimate the parameters of each decision

process while simultaneously estimating the probability that each process applies to the

sample [Evc96]. In this chapter we will be using the canonical case of lottery choices
in a laboratory experiment. The main focus of this section is the heterogeneity of the

subpopulations and its treatment by the mixture model. More precisely, dealing with
heterogeneity, we want to identify which people behave according to what theory and

where. This would allow for heterogeneous theories to co-exist within a grand likelihood

function. As a result, we will no more need to pose the famously extreme, unrealistic, and
increasingly criticized assumption known as Representative Agent. In fact, the idea of

Representative Agent and his expected decision making behavior in society have long been

used in the Economic Theories, before being recently severely criticized and essentially
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abandoned. Let us first summarize our experimentation context, or frames, and the
specifications of the two models EUT and PT that we are intending to nest within one

same Grand Likelihood function. This would mean that although we admit that the
heterogeneity can involve more than two different families of populations, for our purpose,

and without loss of generality, we are using a model that would only contain EUT and PT
decision making patterns. The decision making contexts or frames used in this chapter

for the purpose of building a finite mixture model are as follows:

The data gathered by Glenn W. Harrison, E. Elisabet Rutstrom involves 158
subjects who took part in their experiment. They will be making a total of 9311 choices.
That is, each individual would be making about 60 decisions. Our gain frame contains

0, 5, 10, 15 dollar prizes, involving 63 subjects. The loss frame starts off with a 15

dollar initial endowment, then 0, -5, -10, -15 dollar prizes, involving 53 subjects. The
purpose of the initial endowment for decisions involving possible losses is to make sure
the net final outcomes remain positive. The mixed frame offers an $8 initial endowment
to each subject, and then -8, -3, 3, 8 dollar prizes, involving 37 subjects. Again, the

initial endowment is offered in order to avoid negative net prospects. An initial random
endowment of 1 to 10 dollars is affected to all participants in order to further raise the
possible outcomes towards the positive side. Probabilities used in the decision making

situations are: 0, 0.13, 0.25, 0.37, 0.5, 0.62, 0.75, and 0.87. These probabilities are roughly
evenly spread across the interval 0 to 1. In fact, the steps are either +0.12 or +0.13. For

every prospect, these probabilities indicate the chances of receiving the indicated prize.
The even distribution of the probabilities would help avoid possible biases due to abrupt
changes in the chances of winning the prospects. In fact; the experimentation is based

on presenting to the decider one pair of prospects on the left side of the screen, and

one pair of prospects on the right hand side. The subject would therefore choose the
pair of prospects that seems more worthy than the other pair. Thus, given the above

probabilities a typical question presented to a given individual would involve two amounts

x and y on the left hand side, and two amounts z and w on the right hand side. Each
amount would have an associated probability of win. The formalized representation of

such questions would look like the following:
Left prospect (x, .13; y, .37) versus Right prospect (z, .25; w, ,75).
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4.1

Expected Utility Specification
The CRRA, Constant Relative Risk Aversion, called the parameter r, is defined

over the final monetary prize [GH08]. As seen above, the monetary prize is forced to

be positive due to initial endowments. We assume that the utility function is given by:
U (s, x) = (s + x)r where,
- r is the CRRA parameter to be determined,
- s is the fixed endowment mentioned above, and
- x is the lottery prize.
4

- The expected utility of every lottery EU =

Pk-Uki where U is the utility
k=l

function specified above and indexed here from 1 to 4 since 4 outcomes are presented to
the subject in each lottery. And, Pk represents the probability associated to Ur The
values-used for probabilities Pk are chosen from the evenly distributed values seen above.

- For a given r, XEU = EUr — EUl is called index XEU. This index represents

the difference between the pair of lottery prizes presented to the subject on the right

hand side of the screen, and the pair of prize presented on the left.
- Logistic function: G {VEU) =

This Logistic Function can be interpreted as: The probability that the right

outcome be chosen is G (\7EUj. Thus, the probability that the left outcome be chosen is

(l-G(VFU)).
Now using the binary notation y± = 1 if right, yi — 0 if left, we can write:

Yi = (Gyi) (1 — G)^~yi^ . This means Yj = G when choice of Right, and, F =

1 — G when choice of Left.

Note: Y represents a given person; i, a given bet; Yi, the probability of observing
the response yi.

Considering that each bet is independent, the probability of one given set of
outcomes, or likelihood, is the product ffy Yi, which obviously results in an extremely
small number. Too small to work with in fact! Therefore we use their Logs, which will

of course be negative values.
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The function Log-likelihood will thus end up looking like:
[ijtLnG (VEIL) + (1 - K) Ln (1 - G (VBtTi))],

LnEUT (r-,y,X) = Yi IsnLiEUT =
i

i

where X is a vector of individual characteristics that implicitly conditions VEU through

r.
That is: r =

+ (fp x F) + (rfi x B) + (fn x H) + (r^izs x BUS) + (tgpa x GPA) +

{fage x age). This function will ultimately be going to be maximized.

4.2

Prospect Theory Specification
Tversky and Kahnman have used a popular parametric specification which is

the one used here. The two main components of this specification are the utility function,
and the probability weighting function.

The Utility function applies over gains and losses separately and relative to a reference
point, as opposed to applying to final outcomes as in EUT.

A probability weighting function humanizes the pure rational probabilities and gives us

subjective probabilities, thus more humanized.
Other characteristics of the model are as follows:

Losses, loom larger than gains, since the humans would behave as such.
Non linearity in the transformed probabilities accounts for different risk attitudes.

This mixture model also provides for individual characteristics (called vector X)
built into r for EUT and into a, fi, X for PT.

The separate functions defined for gains and losses are:
Gains (x > 0) => U (x) = xa,
Losses (e(0) => (7 (x) = —X(—x)^
where

and /3 are risk aversion parameters, and A is the coefficient of loss aversion.

Subjective probabilities which characterize the Prospect Theory are here mod

eled by:
p-y

[P7+(l-P)'1']7 ’
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where w humanizes the propabilities, or said differently, introduces the decision maker’s
subjectivities. The rest of procedures are identical to EUT; meaning :
VPU = PUR - PUL.

The likelihood, therefore, will depend on estimates of a,/?, A, 7 and on ingredi
ents of X.
And finally, the function Log-likelihood for the Prospect Theory component of
the mixture model at this point is:

LnL^ (a,0, A,7; y, X) = £ [yiLnG (VPUi) + (1 - yi)Ln(k- G (VPl/,))]
i

=
i

4.3

Nesting of the Expected Utility Theory and Prospect

Theory Models Inside the Function Grand-Log-Likelihood
Let

denote the probability that EUT is the correct model, and, ff

denote the probability that PT is the correct model. Then:
—
/
*
FT/T
function GrandLog-Likelihood can now be written as: LnL lr,a,p,A,7,fI

The
\
=

[(n^r x Lf^J + (IT x L^)]
At this point, the right choices of the parameter arguments will be the ones that
maximize the Grand-Log-Likelihood.

4.3.1 The Results of the Finite Mixture Model Experimentation
Table 4.1 Table 4.1 shows that EUT and PT probabilities indicate that each is equally
likely for the data we had [GH08]. They are 0.550 versus 0.450.

Secondly, we see that the estimates for PT specification are only weekly consistent

with a priori predictions of the theory: A = 1.380 while7 = 0.911, are both too close
to 1; a = 0.710 and

= 0.723 are almost identical., d > 0

Whereas, When the mixture model is used, the value for A = 5.781, while 7 = 0.681

becomes, both more PT like. While, a — 0.614 and 0 = 0.132, are no more identical.
Using the PT model for the subpopulation that has a better probability of fitting
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Parameter

Estimates tiwn Conditional Models

or Test

Estimate

Standard Error

p-vofue

Estimates from Mixture Model
Lower 95%

Upper 95%

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

Confidence

Confidence

Confidence

Confidence

Interval

Interval

Estimate

Standard Error

p-vaiue

Interval

Interval

r

0,867

0.029

0.000

0.809

0.924

0.846

0.044

0.000

0.759

0.933

a

0.710

0.046

0.000

0.620

0.801

0.614

0.057

0.000

0.501

0.727

p
X
r
aEWT

0.723

0.065

0.000

0.695

0.851

0.312

0.132

0.019

0.052

0.572

1.380

0.223

0.000

0.940

1.820

5.781

1,612

0.000

2.598

8.965

0.911

0.061

0.000

0.790

1.033

0.681

0.047

0.000

0.587

0.774

0.550

0.072

0.000

0.407

0.692

0.450

0.072

0.000

0.308

0.592

W,o:sEUT=rrPT

Hq: a sa fl
Hq; X ■=> I
Hq: y = I

0.490
0.861

0.046

0.090

0.003

0.151

0.000

Table 4.1: Estimates for Parameters in Conditional and Mixture Models
into that model and letting EUT talk for the rest of the population seems therefore
to be better modeling of this set of data.

Table 4.2 Table 4.2 shows the optimal estimates calculated under mixture model with

individual characteristics included- For example, a 21 year old non Hispanic black
female, who did not have a business major and had an average GPA, would have
an estimate of r given by:

r = r0 + r FEM ALE + rBLACK + rAGE x 21.

Notice that the set of estimated characteristics is reasonably large, allowing consid
erable heterogeneity for a given subject and among subjects.

Figure 4.1 Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of predicted probabilities of the two com
peting models. The two panels are by construction the mirror image of each other.
In fact, we have had

“ FI^7 ) ? since we 0I1br have two competing

models.
Figure 4.2 Figure 4.2 indicates the uncertainty of these predicted probabilities. Note
that uncertainty is smaller at the end points. This result is consistent with the use

of discrimination functions such as the logistic function. Also, EUT has more of its

support closer to the upper end-point where some subjects are better characterized
by it.
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The two panels are by construction the mirror image of each other.

1
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Figure 4.1: Probability of Competing

Predicted
Standard
Error of
Probability

Figure 4.2: Predicted Probability of Expected Utility Theory Model
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Figures 4.3 and 4.4 Figures 4.3 and 4.4 clearly indicate that males are more likely to

behave according to EUT model. Whereas females density is highest on the smaller
probabilities, indicating that their behavior is less likely to be according to
EUT.

On the other hand, the black almost never make their decisions on the EUT model.

For the others, they are mixed, with majority of them on the right side of Jj

=

0.5.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 Another benefit of using a mixed model can be seen here: Among
those with at least 25% chance of being EUT-consistent, that is 126 subjects out of

our total of 158, their CRRA, or risk aversion coefficient average of 0.98.

As expected from an EUT subpopulation.

Whereas, the same CRRA components among those with at least 25% chance of
being PT-consistent, that is 114 out of 158 subjects, are as follows: a < 0.5 avg
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Figure 4.4: Ethnicity, Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory
0.44

> 0.5 avg 0.51 A > 1 avg 5.81 7 < 1 avg 0.89

As expected from a PT-inclined subpopulation.

4.4

Scale Independence of Finite Mixture Models
A utility function is a function U of some amount of money x that represents the

satisfaction of taking possession of x. Utility functions are used both in EU and Prospect

Theory. In general, we do not have access to a direct measurement of U, so the utility
function is only considered to be known up to some parameters which must be estimated.

As a modeler, we postulate that the true utility experienced by people belongs to some

family of functions, parameterized lets say by h] U(xji). EU and Prospect Theory are

frameworks for mapping a family of utility functions U(xji') to the choices that people
make when making decisions under uncertainty. These frameworks provide a probability

that a person will make a given set of choices for a given h. When data has been acquired
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For subjects with at least 25% chance of being EUT-consistent (N=126)

Figure 4.5: Constant Relative Risk Aversion parameter of the Expected Utility Theory
Model

on the actual decisions of an actual person, we can then find the value ho of h that
maximizes the probability that the person made the decisions it actually made. The

function x-^U(x,h) for this value of ho is then deemed to be the best description of the
actual satisfaction U of the person among the family we started off with. The process
of using data to find ho, the h that best explains the data, is called inferring ho, or

(statistical) inference.
One desirable property of a utility function is that it be independent of the

denomination of x, whether it be dollars or cents or yens, etc. This makes sense because
the denomination shouldn’t affect the modeling in any way other than through a re

adjustment of parameters. If a utility function U(x, h) is not scale independent, changing
the formulation from dollars to cents would change the family of functions we are consid

ering, and would in general lead to a different value for the function x -^-U(x, ho) once ho

has been inferred. If the utility function is scale independent, changing the formulation
from dollars to cents would change the value of ho, but the resulting U(x, ho) would be

the same, because the change in inferred ho would exactly compensate for the change in
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For subjects with at least 25% chance of being PT-consistent (N=114)

Figure 4.6: Parameters of the Prospect Theory Model
denomination.
In formal terms, a utility function U(x,h) parameterized by h is scale indepen

dent if for all h and all re-scalings of the denomination d > 0, there exists hi such that

U(x,h) = U(d x x, hi). This is the formalization of exactly what was explained in the
previous paragraph.

The utility function developed by Glenn W. Harrison, E. Elisabet Rutstrom in
the wedding and funeral paper is not scale independent. They use U(x,h) = xr, where

the parameter h = r. For a given d different from 1, there exists no way to change r so

as to compensate for changing x into dx x. This is bad. A better utility function would
include an additional scale variable g: U(x, {r, g}), so that h = {r, g} of the following

form: U(x, {r,g}) = (x x g)r. Now all one needs to do to compensate for a change in

denomination d is to take g = 1/d. Note that this procedure of adding a parameter for

scale is general, and can be done for any utility function to make it scale independent.
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Parameter

Variable

Estimate

Standard

p-value

Error

r

a

Y

-0.940
-0.469

0.449
-0.076

-0.428
-0.929

-0.242

0.101

0352

0.485

-0.273

0.099

Black

-0.043

0.195

0.007
0.824

Hispanic

0.174
0.018

0.001

Age

-0.586
0.065

0.001

0.028

Business
GPAlow

-0.104
0.042

0.099

0.291

Constant
Female
Black
Hispanic

0.549
-0.201
-0.101
-0.128
0.053

0.083
0.256
0.215
0.216
0.355
0.292

0.616
0.034

-0.299
-0.122

Constant
Female
Black

i.

Confidence
Interval

-0.246

0.059
-0.202

0.196

0.453

1.199
0.749

0.300

0.291

0.350
0.640
0.718
0.857
0.765
0.866

Upper 95%

Interval
Constant
Female

Business
GPAlow

P

Lower 95%
Confidence

0.043
-0.625
-0329
-0.829
-0324

0341

0.090

0.205
1.055
0.223
0.326
0.572
0.629

0.446
2.166

0346

-0.328
-2371
-1.026

0.303

-0.274

0.875

1.933

Hispanic

0.172

0.504

0.733

-0.822

1.167

. Age
Business

0.010

0.013

0.442

-0.016

0.036

0.130

0.451

0.774

-0.760

GPAlow

0.095
1.592

0.175

-0.250
-12358

1.020
0.440

-23.832

15.818

—8303

-0.486

7.164

0.587
0.824

Female
Black

-4.007
-4.494

10.037
2.029

0.690
0.028

Hispanic

-5.083

-9.137

-1.028

0.523
-2.981

2.053
0366

0.014

Age

0357
0.183

-0395
-7.378

1.641
1.417

0.875
0.011

-4.036

3.441

0.157
0.266

1.171
0.683

-0.234

0.252
2,127

Constant

Business
GPAlow

-0.297

2.226
1.893

Constant
Female

0.664
0.474

0.257
0.106

Black

0.009
0.971

0.123
0.585

0.099

0.010
0.180

Hispanic

0.000
0.945

15.742

0.058
0.065

-0,185
-0.041
-0.022

0.001
0.688

0.253

Age

-0.020

Business
GPAlow

0.333
-0.140

0.199

0.482

-0.533

Constant
Female

0.558

1.268

-1.946

3.062

1.638

0307
1.715
3.714

0.660
0.002

0.637

2.640

-1.001
-5.793

5.775
8.880

-0.237

-0,003

-0.395
-0.732

1.686

Black

Hispanic
Age

2.387
1.543
-0.120

0.059

0.166
0.678
0.045

Business

0.774

0392

0.193

GPAlow

0.477

0.612

0.437

1.943

t*1 is the log odds of ths probabilities of each model, where n,EUT =1/(14- expfjr))

Table 4.2: Table of Estimates of all Parameters for Mixture Models with Individual

Covariates
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Chapter 5

Example Applications of Mixture
Models
Mixture models have been used for decades in all sorts of contexts. This last
section details some real world applications of finite mixture models in contexts other

than the one considered by Glenn W. Harrison and Elisabet Rutstrom , [GH08]. After a

general introduction, we review briefly an application used for the diagnosis of blood cells.
We then review another application in astronomy. These overviews intend to reveal the

general use of the finite mixture models in the real world. They also intend to introduce
some basic practical concepts and difficulties only on the surface. We will then continue

with two additional applications. These examples will further show how important con
cepts are used. The third application example will further review the determination of
parameters in the making of diagnosis tools. The last application example will show how
the important technique of Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithms can be used to

obtain optimal values for a model under construction in field of marketing.

5.1

General Introduction and Preview Examples
Finite mixture models have been receiving increasing attention from both a

practical and theoretical point of view (see [Sti86] ChlO). Modeling via finite mixture
distributions involves identifiability problems, the actual fitting of finite mixtures through

use of the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm, the properties of maximum likeli
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hood estimators, the assessment of the number of components to be used in the mixture,
and the applicability of asymptotic theory in providing a basis for the solutions. Scaling of
the EM algorithm allows mixture models to be used in data mining applications involving
massively large data bases. Also, recent use of t components in the mixture model pro

vides a robust approach to mixture modeling. A t number of components would mean the

number of subpopulations, and therefore the number of likelihood functions that are sup

posed to model each subpopulation is not known in advance. Some latest developments in
finite mixture distributions involve hidden Markov models. Successful application fields
of mixture models include astronomy, biology, genetics, medicine, psychiatry, economics,

engineering, and marketing [Eve96]. Moreover, finite mixture models, provide cluster and

latent class analyses, discriminant analysis, image analysis, and survival analysis. Thus,
mixture models can also reveal the existence of previously unrecognized or undefined
subpopulations, or substructures, as we will see below in Kriessler and Peers astronomy
discoveries (see [GM01], Chapter 6). In fact, in some applications of some mixture mod

els, there is sufficient a priori information for the number of components g in the mixture
model to be specified with no uncertainty. However, on many occasions, the number of
components has to be inferred from the data, along with the parameters in the compo
nent densities. For instance, the red blood cell volume distribution of healthy individuals

can be modeled adequately by a single log normal component. However, for patients not

completely recovered from anemia, their red blood cells distribution, although unimodal
in appearance toward the end of the iron therapy treatment, may still need to be mod
eled by a two-component log normal mixture due to the presence of a sufficient number
of microcytic cells in relation to the normocytic cells. Thus the result of a statistical test

on the number of components in the log normal mixture model for a specific patient can
be used as an early guide to aid clinicians in making a decision when to suspend iron

therapy treatment for a patient. A non-significant test result is consistent with the red
blood cell distribution of the patient having returned to a healthy state. For an applica

tion of insufficient a priori information for the number of components, let’s consider the
recent discoveries in astronomy. As explained by Kriessler and Beers (1997), it was once
assumed that most clusters of galaxies (subpopulations) were relaxed systems that could

be adequately modeled by a simple set of parameters, such as a single-core radius and

the velocity dispersion of neighboring galaxies. However, numerous recent studies have
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concluded that many, perhaps even most, clusterings are far from being in dynamical

equilibrium. Evidence cited includes the existence of: (a) clumpy distributions of galax
ies seen in the projection on the sky, (b) apparent structure in the distribution of radial

velocities for cluster membership, and (c) multiple centers of X-ray-derived temperature
profiles, suggestive of ongoing collisions. The desire to identify substructure in clusters of
galaxies has led to the bootstrap form of the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) for the number
of components in a mixture model being applied in studies in astronomy. Bootstrap is

a powerful technique that permits the variability in a random quantity to be assessed
using just the data in hand. Recent papers in the astronomical literature in which this
method has been used for investigating substructure in galaxy clusters include those by

Ashman and Bird (1993, 1994), Bird (1994a, 1994b, 1995), Beers and Sommer-Larsen

(1995), Bird, Davis, and Beers (1995), Davis et al. (1995), Zepf, Ashman, and Geisler

(1995), and Bridges et al. (1997).
For example, Kriessler and Beers (1997) concluded from their use of this statis

tical test'that 57% of the Dressier (1980) morphological-sample clusters have statistically
significant substructure. Figure 5.1, which is taken from Kriessler and Beers (1997), gives
the contour plots of bivariate normal mixtures fitted to the positions of some of the galaxy

clusters (see [GM01] page 197). Figure 5.1 exposes the adaptive-kernel density contour

maps of galaxy positions in Dresslers morphological sample. The filled circles in the fig
ure indicate the positions of galaxies identified by Dressier (1980). The crosses mark the
average positions identified as significant in the normal mixture fit.

5.2

Medical Diagnosis
Let us continue with an example of using a mixture model to make good use

of medical data, in view of predicting the chances that given individuals have certain

diseases. Screening for various diseases based on a patient’s medical history and data can
be hard even for the trained physician because of the number of factors that need to be

taken into account [StiS6].
Suppose we have a data set from a large number N of patients who were each

found to have one of 5 conditions, one of which is the “healthy” condition, and four of
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which are pathological; we also assume that patients cannot have multiple conditions, so
patient i is associated with a single known condition J(i). For each patient, we have a set
of 16 standard medical measurements: blood pressure, age, weight, etc. Each patient i is

characterized by a vector Xi of 16 numbers, and by their known condition J(i). We would

like to use this data to form a model which will allow us to assess the risk of disease for
future patients based on their 16 standard measurements.

Formulated as such, this is a relatively easy problem which maps nicely into
the mixture model setting. We can assume that each of the 5 groups of people in the 5

conditions has a distinct distribution of the 16 medical measurements. We will suppose
that patients have probability pj of having condition j, for j G {1,2,3,4,5}, and that

each condition j gives rise to a Gaussian distribution of medical measurements with mean
vector pj € S16. and covariance matrix Cj € K16*16, so that the probability density of

a patient with condition j having medical measurements x are given by the Gaussian

density:
P^UM = j) = -E=e-^x‘-^TcE^

\/l27rCll
It is now possible to infer the parameters {(pj,Pj, Cj)}jG[i,2,3,4,5} °f this mixture

model, because we know in advance which patients belong to which of the 5 mixture

components. The parameters pj are simply obtained from the number of patients Nj
in condition j, as the empirical average number of patients having that condition. The
parameters pj and Cj for patients with condition j are obtained the way parameters of a

gaussian are usually estimated: equivalently by maximum likelihood or with the empirical

estimators of the mean and covariance of the x/s:
Pj = Nj/N

~ pp

52

Cj = N- 1
With these three simple equations, we have estimated all the parameters of the
model. Now given a new patient with medical measurements x, we can calculate their
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probability of having condition j by calculating pfyja?) = p(x, j)/p(x) where p(x,j) =
pM)pW = P&\j)pj and p(x) = '£j<p(x,j/)-.

?W|z) =

pW)Pj
Y'j'PWfyj'’

- w)]

=
£/

exp [-1^ - ^)TG^{Xi - W)]

This would ultimately mean that, given the medical characteristics of an indi

vidual represented by the vector x, we can calculate the probabilities for the individual

to be affected by each one of the five health conditions j. Thus the highest probability

associated with one of the five health conditions j would be the one the doctor might

decide to worry about.

5.3

Consumer Spending
Different consumers choose to spend their money differently. It is reasonable to

consider that consumers might fall into groups with similar tastes and spending habits.

Having a model of the distribution of consumers, how they cluster into groups, and what
the spending habits of each group is could be useful in several business contexts. For

example, we could be a business scouting out potential consumer markets, in view of de

signing a new product targeted for a particular group of consumers. Or we could already
have a product which we would like to market to a suitable group of consumers.
Suppose we have data on the spending habits of thousands of people. We know

the amount that was spent by each person in each of 12 categories of spending: groceries,
clothing, restaurants, automobile, air fares, other transportation, insurance, rent, educa

tion, etc. Each person is represented by the 12-dimensional vector of amounts they spent
in each category.
If there were only 2 spending categories, we could just make a 2-dimensional
scatter plot, with the 2 axes being the amount spent in each of the 2 categories, and one
point for each person surveyed. We would then look at this cloud of points and hopefully

see that these points cluster into groups, which we could identify as distinct consumer
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groups. However we have 12 categories instead of 2, so visualizing clusters in this way is

impossible.

In this context, mixture models are a good way of inferring clusters of consumers

as well as the distribution of their spending habits, even if we cannot do so “by eye”.
Let’s see how this can be formalized, and what the difficulties are in applying mixture
model methods.

This new example application of Gaussian mixture models presents a little more

difficulty than the previous medical one, because we don’t know which cluster each con

sumer belongs to in advance; we don’t even know how many clusters there are. As it

turns out, it is still possible to make progress in this situation.
In the medical example, we saw that if we know which cluster each patient be

longed to, we could calculate all the model parameters in a straightforward manner. Then

given the model parameters, we saw how to calculate the probabilities of each patient
belonging to each condition. What we can do in the case where we don’t know in advance

which cluster each person belongs to is as follows: we can guess how many clusters there
should be, and we can start with a random initial guess of the model parameters. Then
for these parameters, we can calculate the probabilities of each person belonging to each

cluster [GM01J. Using these probabilities, we can estimate the model parameters. Given

these new model parameters, we can estimate the probabilities of each person belonging
to each cluster once again, and using these new assignments, we can re-estimate the pa

rameters once again. In this way, we can alternate between re-estimating parameters and
re-estimating the probabilities of each person belonging to each cluster, and hope that at

each iteration, the parameter estimate will get better and better.

As it turns out, this procedure, called Expectation Maximization or the EM
algorithm, is guaranteed to improve the model parameter estimates after each iteration,

and converge to an estimate of these parameters which locally maximizes the likelihood of

the data. Since we are estimating parameters in the maximum likelihood setting, we can

see parameter estimation as an optimization problem: we are looking for the parameters

47

which maximize the likelihood. We can view the likelihood function as a landscape with
hills and valleys, in the high-dimensional space where parameters live: finding the best

parameters consists in finding the highest peak in this landscape. The EM algorithm is
guaranteed to find a peak in this landscape. However, it is not guaranteed that the peak

it finds is the highest peak in the landscape; this is why we say that EM converges to
a local maximum, as opposed to a global maximum. Starting EM with different initial
guesses for the parameters will result in converging on different peaks in general.

This is particularly a problem for Gaussian mixture models, because the Gaus

sian components of the mixture can become unboundedly sharp around a single data
point, and this would make the likelihood of the data become infinite: this happens when

one of the mixture components j has a mean equal to one of the data points, and the
covariance matrix Cj of that component goes to zero. For a Gaussian mixture model,
there are in general many peaks, a lot of which are actually infinite, and which we would

like to avoid, because they are spurious: they are overfitting single points in the data.
There are various ways of dealing with this problem, which we will not get into.

However in practice, given a decent initial guess for the model parameters, ap

plying, the EM algorithm will most often converge onto a model which is reasonable and

useful [GM01].
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Figure 5.1: Adaptive-Kernel Density Contour Maps of Galaxy Positions in Dressier’s

Morphological Sample
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Chapter 6

Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced the decision making contexts in order to better

understand the two major decision making making theories, the Expected Utility The

ory, the Prospect Theory, and their applications. We then, investigated the finite mixture

models using these two theories within a larger likelihood function. The application ex
ample of the finite mixed model containing these two theories as their major ingredients

paved the way for approaching more application examples in Chapter 5. These exam

ples included discussions such as identifiability problems, fitting of finite mixture models
through the EM algorithm, and construction of maximum likelihood functions. The finite

mixture models are increasingly used in all areas of science. This project gave me the
opportunity to discover some of the major ways mathematics contribute to improve our
lives. The understanding, the curiosity, and the knowledge that I have built through this

project add‘to the excitement that I enjoy as a life time learner. Also, I am so grateful
to have had the opportunity to share this enrichment as a graduate student of CSUSB.
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